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VOL. XV. JUNE, 1917 No. a.
PARTNERSHIP ENTITY AND TENANCY IN PARTNER-
SHIP: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DEFINITION.
"p ARTNERSHIP is a legal entity formed by the association
of two or more persons."' This definition of a partner-
ship as a person or entity represents what may be char-
acterized as a generally accepted theory among American jurists at
the time of its publication in 1893. But a later definition says: "A
partnership is an association of two more persons." "A partner
is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property hold-
ing as a tenant in partnership. 2 The second definition shows that
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have rejected the entity
theory and coined a new term to describe partnership holding.
At the beginning of every discussion as to the nature of partner-
ship 3 one is likely to find the dictum of Sir GWoRGE JZSSIM, Master
of Rolls. In speaking of agency as a test of the existence of a part-
nership in law without agreement of the parties he says: "You
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless you
grasp the notion of the existence of the firm as an entity separate
from the existence of the partners; a notion which was well
grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly under-
stood in the courts of equity before it was part of the whole law of
the land as it is now. But when you get that idea clearly, you will
see at once what sort of agency it is. It is the one person acting on
behalf of the firm. He does not act as agent, in the ordinary sense
of the word, for the others so as to bind the others; he acts on be-
' Parsons. On Partnership. 4th ed.. revised by Beale (1893), P. x.
2The Uniform Partnership Act, [cited hereafter as U. P. A.]. Adopted by The
Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, October 14, 1914. Sec. 6 (1)
and 25 ().
3 Parsons, On Partnership, 4th ed., revised by Beale, p. 3; Burdick, On Partnership,
2nd ed., p. 177; Gilmore, On Partnership, p. 273; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 766; 57 Cent. Law
Jour. 343.
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half of the firm of which they are members; and as he binds the
firm and acts on the part of the firm, he is properly treated as the
agent of the firm. If you cannot grasp the notion of a separate
entity for the firm then you are redu&ed to this, that inasmuch as he
acts partly for himself and partly for the others, to the extent that
he acts for the others he must be an agent, and in that way you
get him to be an agent for the other partners, but only in this way,
because you insist upon ignoring the existence of the firm as a sep-
arate entity."' This dictum was uttered at a time when the modem
theory of partnership entity was well developed both in this country
and in England, in the writings of scientific jurists and in the dicta
of courts, though not to any considerable extent in the decisions
themselves. It is usually assumed to be an authority for the doc-
trine that the partnership is a legal person and not an association of
natural persons; but a careful analysis of it will show that this con-
clusion is scarcely warranted from the words themselves. In fact
the latter part of the citation given above seem to indicate that even
the learned Master of Rolls himself might possibly have admitted a
different interpretation.
The concept of a unit entity in partnership is identical with the
idea of the juristic person in a corporate body, that is, the natural
persons, A, B3 and C become by their association an X persona which
enters into legal relations with other personae through the agency
of A, B or C. It is evident that this is the concept in the mind of
JissEL, and his dictum may therefore be properly cited as authority
for the entity theory. But at the end of his statement he suggests
another solution-though only to condemn it-and it is this solution
which an overwhelming majority of the courts have implicitly ac-
cepted, though no court, so far as I know, has explicitly stated the
reason for acceptance. The two concepts are so closely related that in
the discussion of them in the cases there is frequently an unconscious
transition, from one to the other, with the consequent confusion in
the conclusion that results from arguing from a premise that has
different meanings which may be easily interchanged. The associa-
tive theory of partnership is implicitly contained in JEssnI's state-
ment, "that inasmuch as he acts partly for himself and partly for
the others, to the extent that he acts for the others he must be an
agent." A, B and C may of course be thought of as constituting a unit
entity, X, external to the natural persons, who act as its agents but
what we do actually think of in a partnership is that each partner acts
for the others and for himself. It should be noted also that this latter
4 Pooley v. Driver, 5 Cl. Div. 458, (1876).
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concept may be thought of as an entity, but it certainly is a very
different concept from that of the juristic person. It might well be
characterized as a composite entity but it is not the unit entity of the
juristic person. It will be found on examination of the sources that
only the composite entity existed in the old Roman law of partner-
ship, that the composite entity was identified with the unit entity
in the mediaeval law merchafit, but that the. attempt to amalgamate
the former with the latter in English and American courts has not
yet been crowned with success, and if our new UNIFORM PARTNER-
sHip ACT should be generally adopted in American jurisdictions
the tendency toward their amalgamation will be delayed, if not per-
manently checked. Whether such an effect would be desirable or
not will be considered later.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws who codified the
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT seem to have tried to avoid the danger
of too rigid a definition of partnership by describing it as an "asso-
ciation" and callingits members "tenants in partnership,
' 'e giving us
thus a new form of tenure, though apparently one, not invented by
the Commissioners themselves. Back of this formulation by the
codifiers there is a long and interesting discussion, and as much of
the trouble seems to have been caused by a confusion of terminology
and. an attempt toforce new-wine into old bottles with the usual un-
satisfactory consequences, it seems that a re-examination of the
sources and a careful study of the historical development of the two
conflicting ideas may clarify our thinking and aid in the solution of
the very practical question as to .whether or, not our legislatures
should adopt the, UN Ion, PARTNERSHIP ACT as the best statement
of our present law on the subject.
As soon as. several men .begin to hold property togethier or act
together in.some common enterprise we are at once confronted with
a number ,of perplexing questions as to their legal relations to each
other, to other persons or groupS and to. the property with which
they may. deal. These problems are as old as society itself, 'and it
is not surprising that the advocates of either side 6f the dispute
have sought for assistance in the'three main sources of our partner-
Sship law; namely, the-Roman Law, the Law Merchant of medieval
times and the Common Law. The various associative relations are
arranged in a graduated hierarchy of groups. At the bottom is the
least complicated form. It is simply a common holding. This is the
3Entity is defined by the Century Dictionary as, An independent ens. Ens, which
is the present partikiple of the Latin esse, is defined as that which in any sense is.
For Dean Lewis's definition of an entity, see post, note 84.
For the origin of this institution, see post, p. 618, note 31.
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communio or codominimn of the Roman law and in English law
appears as a joint tenancy with four unities, a coparcenary with
three unities or a tenancy in common with a single unity. The
fundamental characteristic of these is that each is a passive right.
It is a group-holding, a tenure. A, B and C are thought of simply as
co-holders. This group hereafter will be referred to as the tenure
concept, and may be thought of objectively as A, B and C included
within a circle.
The next higher group has active as well as passive rights; i. e.,
there is not only a group tenure but a group activity. An example
of this both in Roman and English law is a co-principalship, in which
an agent acts for joint principals. 7 Just above this is the societas
of the Roman Law, the partnership of English law. The subject
matter of this paper is the intrinsic-possibly one might say the
metaphysical-character of this institution, if, to paraphrase THom-
ASIuS, a legalist may dare to insert his sickle into the field of dread
metaphysics. All systems of law agree that partnership usually in-
cludes the basic element of tenure. A, B and C hold property to-
gether. But beside this passive right they have active functions.
They deal with the property, with each other and with other persons
and groups. This partnership group will hereafter be referred to
as the firm concept. It may be thought of objectively as A, B and
C at the apices of a triangle whose sides represent the relation of
mutual principalship and agency, with- the triangle inclosed in a
circle to represent the common tenure.'
Outside of these groups and differing from them not only in
degree but in kind is-the institution known as the juristic person or
corporation. Whereas in the partnership group we have the concept
of A, B and C holding property together and each acting for himself
and for the others in their dealings; in the corporation we have the
highly abstract concept of A, B- and C acting as agents for a persona,
X, extrinsic to themselves. This extrinsic persona is a unit entity.
It existed in the classical Roman law but according to the generally
I This grouping is of no importance for us in the present discussion, although it
is shown by arguments in modem cases that the courts still have difficulty in distinguish-
ing joint agency from the mutual principalship and- agency, of a partnership. Cf. the
case of French v. Styring, 2 C. B. R. (N. S.) 355 (1857), and the discussion in Beecher
v. Bush, 45 Mich. 200.
a Closely allied to the partnership grouping is the joint trust, in which A, B and C
hold property jointly, to be devoted to a specific purpose; e. g., the benefit of some
other party or parties. This associative activity is said by Maitland, in his Translator's
Introduction to Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Ages, p. xxiii, to go back
to the Lex Salica where the "trustis is a group of comrades." It has however attained
its highest development not in Continental but in English law. It however, like the
co-agency, need not be considered here.
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accepted theory it was recognized as a legal institution at a compara-
tively late period and then only in the law of corporations. Object-
ively it may be thought of as an X persona extrinsic to the natural
persons A, B and C, who act as its agents. This corporate grouping
will hereinafter 'be referred to as the unit entity. An entity in this
sense does not exist in the classical Roman law of partnership. This
is admitted even by the advocates of the entity theory in the modem
law of partnership.' Whether this entity is a fiction or a real exist-
ence is not pertinent to this discussion. We are concerned only with
its characteristic as an entity extrinsic to the natural persons. It is
also of no moment as to whether this concept of a juristic person
came into the classical Roman law early or late. It is only to be
noted that it does not exist at all in tFe partnership law of the
classical period.
There has always been in all systems of law a fairly clear idea of
the nature of common tenure, i. e., the mere associative holding of
property. It is only when we come to the associative'activities that
.our. legal thinking, begins to get hazy. The 'two concepts that have
become blurred in the nineteenth century are, on the one hand, the
associative activity of the partnership group (the firm concept), and
on the other, the activity of the juristic person through'the agency
of the individuals who are extrinsic to the juristic persona (the unit
entity). It should be borne in mind that either the associative
activity of the group or the juristic person may be called an "entity,"
in the .sense that each is an actually existent concept, hut the term
is usually applied only to the entity which is also a unity, i. e., the
juristic person. This is the sole use when we come to talk of cor-
porations, and when we are dealing with partnership it seems that
much of our confusion arises from the old error of formal logic,
namely, reasoning from a divided middle.'
PARTNERSHIP ENTITY IN CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW.
ULPIAN says: "There mu t ,be a partnership, if one would bring an
action pro socio, for group tenure without partnership will not war-
rant the action. '"10 He here recognizes the group tenure and makes
plain the distinction between group tenure and group tenure plus
group activity, the last of which constitutes a partnership. But at
an earlier place in the DIGEsT, 1' under the title "Cominuni Dividun-
do," PAuLus confuses the simple group tenure with the partnership
9 28 Harv. L-. Rev. 763 and Note 7.
10 Ut dit pro soedo actio. societatem intercedere oportet; nee enin sufficit rem esse
communem, nisi societas intercedit. Digest 7. 2. 4r.
12 Si inter socios convenisset ne intra * * * certum tempus societas divideretur.
Digest, 1o. S. 14. 3.
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holding. He talks about a division of the societas by the socii in a
discussion of a severance of the jointure of tenants. There is the
same confusing use by the Roman jurists of the term socius. Occa-
sionally we find it with the meaning of joint tenant, -12 though it is
regularly used meaning partner. There seems to be no attempt at
defining societas in the DIGEST, either because the classical jurists did
not feel the need of it or, as seems more probable, they felt that
they were unable to formulate an abstract definition.'1
There is then in the classical Roman law a well defined concept of
the common holding, commumio, codorninium, existing either without
qualification, i. e., equivalent to a common law tenure, or in connec-
tion with societas in which, in addition to a common holding, we
have the associative activity. There seems, however, to be no inti-
mation in the Roman sources that this associative activity is that
of a juristic person. Therefore Sir GEORGE JESSEL'S statement in
Pooley v. Driver that the "notion [of an entity] was well grasped
by the Roman lawyers" is either wrong or the "entity" referred to is
not the unity of a juristic person but an entity thought of as a com-
posite activity. JEssEIr seems to see this dimly, as is evident from the
latter part of his statement cited at the beginning of this paper.
But although JEssEL does impliedly recognize the composite
entity in the associative activity of a partnership, those who cite his
dictum stress.only the earlier part of it, which speaks of a unit entity
such as is found in the juristic person. This entity as a unity exists
in the classical Roman law but it seems to have developed at a
late period and then not in the law of partnership but in
connection with the universitas, our modem corporate idea. Even
here the concept of this entity as a fictitious person and a unity in
our modern sense was never fully grasped by the old Roman law-
yers.'4 The partnership in the old Roman law is a group having a
common tenure together with composite activities of the members,
and there seems to be no tendency to assimilate it to the juristic per-
son, the unit entity of the corporation.
"2 Si fundus communis nobis sit * * * nam et si pars socio tradita fuisset. Digest,
1o. 3. 6. S. Salkowski, Roman Private Law, §124, suggests that partnership was
developed out of the common tenure in the consortium tenure of 2. family. Cf. Pound
in 24 Harv. L. Rev. 603, and Crane in 28 Harv. L. Rev. 764.
Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est. Digest, 5o. xT. 2o2.
14 "The admission must be made that there is no text which directly calls the
universitas a 'persona' and still less any that calls' it 'persona ficta.' " Maitland,
Translator's Introduction to Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Ages, p. XVIII.
Maitland, following Gierke, attributes the fiction theory to IPope Innocent IV, who
came to the papal throne in 1243. See Gierke, Genossenschaftsrecht II1, 279. Cf.
Maitland, I. c. Luckily for our purpose we do not have to pay any attention to the
question as to whether this entity is "fictitious" or "real" because most of the American
cases ignore Gierke's theory.
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In some of the modern discussions of the origin of corporations
in early laws there is an amalgamation of certain characteristics of
the composite entity of the group and the unit entity of the juristic
person. HEARN says "the oldest artificial person seems to have been
the family."' 5 The Romans personified Rora at a very early per-
iod'8 and to the early Romans the gens was as real an existence as the
individual members of it.' We therefore find BLACKSTONE saying
that "the honor of inventing these political constitutions [corpora-
tions] entirely belongs to the Romans. They were introduced, as
PLuTAncH says, -by NUMA." 1 8 This statement of BLACKSTONE may,
however, be catalogued along with the rest of his historical inven-
tions, the stock theory being that, "the conception of a juristic person
was not introduced into the private law of Rome till the time of the
Empire."' 9 It seems probable that the familia and the gens, while they
had a real existence as a concept in the minds of primitive Romans,
were a group rather than a unit entity or as personifications they
had rather a religious2 than a legal signification and'apparently never
got -beyond that stage. The personification of the city Roma is to be
compared with that of Divus Augustus rather than with the juristic
person, the imperial fiscus.
We find in mediaeval law an interesting survival of the old family
idea carried over into the law of the gilds,21 the members of which
were thought of as brothers or sisters in a gild family. These fam-
ily groups have however the characteristics of archaic law. They
belong to the early period of Roman law and to the naive period of
mediaeval law. The conception of them is hazy and undifferentiated
and in this respect they differ from the sharply defined concept of
the unit entity of the juristic person which belongs to the later period
of legal thinking. Both concepts are abstractions but whereas the
first one is simply abstract and vague, the other, is alstracted and
more clearly defined.
5.Hearn, The Aryanf Household, p. 64.
" 'Roma was in reality the genius of the city of Rome, and was worshipped as
such from early times." Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and
Mythology.
1 "Each gens had religious ceremonies to perform." * * * "It was a duty to per-
petuate this worship from generation to generation." * "The gods of the gens--
Dei gentiles-protected no other gens." Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, p. 135.
sCommentaries 1, 48.
19Cf. Sohm, Institutes, "p. P89.
' "The best established and most prominent characteristic of the gens is, that, like
the family it had a worship." Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., p. 139.
zScott's, Joint Stock Companies to 1720, p. 3. "Early gilds or fellowships were
marked by the analogy of the family. The members were usually described as 'brethren'
and 'sistern.' whether there was any conscious reference to an artificial family is
not certain."
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THE ENTITY THEORY IN .1EDIAEVAL LAW.
During the Middle Ages the law of partnership developed on the
Continent along two distinct lines. From the eleventh century, the
revived civil law of Rome was studied at Bologna, Ravenna and
other Italian cities, and this revived Roman law was afterwards
received by most of the Continental states as the basis of their law.
But from the tenth century, alongside of the common law of the
several states, there began to develop in the fairs and markets of
the towns a body of law known later as the Law Merchant. Ques-
tions involving partners were decided in the courts of the fairs and
markets, and partnership theory was discussed by the Glossators
and Commentators of the civil law. In this way the principles of
the practical Law Merchant tended to become absorbed in the civil
law of the time, very much as the rules of merchants were carried
over into the common law of England by the ruling of the judges
in the English courts, particularly in the court of Lord MANSFIELD
during his long term as Chief Justice.
2
BARTOLUS, the great Italian commentator on the revived Roman
law, says that it was customary throughout almost all of Italy in his
time (fourteenth century) for one partner to use his own name and
the class name of his associates as the title of the firm; i. e., Titius
et socii2 3 BRISSAUD-thinks that such a name given to a partnership
carries with it the idea of a distinct personality.24 Whether this
conclusion of BRISSAUD necessarily follows from his premise may
certainly be questioned. The collective name may be applied to the
associative activity without any thought of a unit entity. The name
is that of a composite entity, A, B and C, holding together and acting
conjointly,. and this composite picture of A, B and C is not a photo-
graph of X. Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason to doubt
that within a century or two after BARTOLUS the mediaeval lawyers
did make this transition, and a partnership becomes from this tihme
on an entity of the unit type. ScAccIA, a writer on the Law Mer-
chant in the sixteenth century, says: Aliud est corpus uiius socie-
tatis, et aliud est quilibet sacius ipsius societatis.2& It is evident that
SCACCIA here has in mind the concept of a partnership existing as a
22See Burdick: What Is a Law Merchant? Select Essays in Anglo-American Law,
Vol. III, P. 45.
"Goldschmidt's, Handelsrecht, p. 276, note 137. Cited by Mitchell, The Law
Merchant-, p. 130, note 2.
2'History of French Private Law, Vol. III, p. 556, of the Continental Legal
History Series.
a2 De Commerciis et Canbio, §i, quaest. 1, 450. Cf. Holdsworth's, The Early His-
tory of Commercial Societies, 38 Juridicial Review, p. 312, from which the last three
references are taken.
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juristic person extrinsic to the partners themself. "'The corpus of
a partnership," he says, "is one thing but any member of the same
partnership is another." The group function of. the partners acting
together has become identified with the juristic person. The part-
nership is no longer an association, it is an entity and that entity is
a unity and not a composite activity. It is worthy of note that if
the word universitatis were substituted for societatis in the above
citation, we should have exactly the same connotation of. a partner-
ship entity that ULPiAN gives to a corporation entity, when he says
that "What is owed to the corporation is not owed to the individual
members, and what the corporation owes the individual members
do not owe."20  If BRISSAUD'S conjecture is right, this amalgama-
tion of the two concepts was brought about by the' application of the
collective name to the group function, a composite entity, and then
the easy transition from the composite entity to the unit entity of
the juristic person. Sir GEoRcE JEssEL's dictum uttered in the latter
part of the nineteenth century shows the same semasiological process
in operation. The reason -&hy it did not produce the same amalga-
mation in the nineteenth century that had occurred in the sixteenth
will be evident at a latter stage of this discussion.
The unit entity concept thus gets into the law of the middle ages
on the Continent, not only in the Law Merchant but also in the
genei'allegal thebry of the times and therefore appears in most of
the 'm'odern Roman derivative systems. It should be remarked again,
h Wever, that this concept does not go back of mediaeval times. It
has 'no warrant from classical Roman law, and a citation of the Law
Merchant, "the mediaeval Roman law and the classical Roman, law
as precedents for the "entity" doctrine has only one unit value and
not three . 2  'So far as precedents are concerned there is no war-
rant for the entity theory of partnership in the classical Roman law.
and its existence in mediaeval law on the C6ntinent Seems to be due
to a false analogy of the unit entity of the juristic person and the
composite entity of the partnership.
T11E ENTITY THEORY 17- THE EARLY ENGLISH LAW.
Before the time of CoKE, who was appointed Lord Chief jus-
tice in the year i6o6, "the Law Merchant as a special law was ad-
ministered in special'courts for a special class of people ;-28 namely,
36 Si quid universitati dehetur, singulis non debctur;" nec quod debet universitas
singuli debent. Digest, 3. 4. 7. 1.
21 This reduction of several precedents to one would be, of course, of little import-
ance, if so much had not been made of the assumed cumulative value of the appearance
of the concept in, several places widely separated in time and space.
2s Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. I1, p. 9, quoted from
Scrutton's General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant. Cf. also Vol. III,
p. 43, from Burdick's, What is a Law Merchant?
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the merchants of the towns and fairs. The few cases that appear
in the Year Books prior to this time deal with partnership and allied
associative relations only incidentally. Most of them are cited under
actions in account or in references to tenures.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there seems to
be in the cases no suggestion of the entity theory of partnership.
Indeed Professor BURwDICK in his article on SoME JUDICIAL
MYTHS, 29 does not cite any authority where a partnership is spoken
of as a distinct person earlier than the fourth decade of the nine-
teenth century. The common law courts of the seventeenth century
did, however, have a great deal of difficulty in differentiating the
passive right of a common holding (the tenure concept) from the
associative active right exercised by partners (the firm concept), and
by premature definition of the latter as identical with the former
they fell into errors similar to those made in our time by identifica-
tion of the composite entity of partnership with the unit entity
of the juristic person.
The few cases in the Year Books which deal with partnership
matters seem to indicate that as early as the fourteenth century
there is a premonition of the "tenancy in partnership" as defined in
the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT,30 the existence of which in Eng-
lish law is so vigorously denied as late as the middle of the nine-
teenth century in an American court.3' In STATHAM'S ABRIDGE-
MXNT, (Accompte, 2I), we find the statement that, "If a man re-
ceive a certain sum of money from me to use in trade, to our com-
mon profit, I should have a special action of Account, etc."132  Sir
JOHN DAvIEs, who writes in the middle of the seventeenth century,
says that this is secundum Legem Mercatoriam, while "by the rule
of the common law, if two men be jointly seized of other goods, the
one shall not call the other to account for the same."33  In a case
tried a few years after the one reported by STATHAM, in an action
2 22 Harv. L. Rev., 396.
"U. P.A. See. 25 (z).
3 Blake v. Nutter (184), ig Me. 17. "There is no such tenure of lands known
to the law as a co-partnership tenure. They must be held either in joifit tenancy or
co-tenancy." For an account of this form of tenure in modern law, Cf. Burdick, Part-
nership Realty. 9 Col. L. Rev.. 213-2i6.
, Statham's Abridgement of the Law. Translated by Klingelsmith, p. 7. This case
is referred by Statham to so Ed. I1 (1337), 'though the translator admits that the
case has not been identified in the "Year Book of that date. -Langdell in A Brief Survey
of Equity Jurisprudence, p. q6 says, "One of two co-partiters never is accountable,to
the other," but Barbour says that this statement applies to the later not the earlier
common law. See The History of Contract in Early English Equity, IV Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History, 14; where several cases of account between partners
are cited from the'Year Books of the fourteenth century.
3 Manuscript Tract on Impositions, published in 1656. See Burdick, op. cit.,
pp. 42 and 48.
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of account against a bailiff of two, not merchants, Serjeant KiRTON
argued that the executors of both ought to join. But the court,
KNYVZT, J., said "A chattel in possession is not like a chattel in
action, for the latter cannot be severed, and his executors cannot
join in the action with the other who survived."' 4 This case is cited
at the beginning of the seventeenth century35 as an authority for the
later well established doctrine, Jus accrescendi inter tuercatores
locuni non habet. DAvIEs, in the work above referred to, says that
this non-survivorship of title among partners comes from the Law
Merchant, while the right of survivorship between two joint tenants
is a rule of the Common Law. It is plain, therefore, that when the
common law courts of England take over the business of the courts
merchant, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the group
holding of the common tenure is quite distinct from the group holding
by partners, which includes not only a common tenure but also a
group activity. It is also an accepted theory that the law of the
tenure is Common Law, while the law of the tenure combined with
the group activity is assumed to be derived from the Law Merchant,
and there seems to be no- attempt until the latter part Qf the seven-
teenth century to assimilate joint tenure to the holding by partners.
In 167o it was held38 that "if there are two partners and one of
them die, .the survivor shall be charged for the whole." In 1683
it was said by the Lord Keeper in Chancery 3 "if the farm had
been taken jointly by them and proved a good bargain, there the
survivor should have the benefit of it; but as to stock employed in
way of trade, that should in no case survive "* * * and the custom
of merchants is extended to all traders to exclude survivorship." It
thus appears that tenancy in partnership as distinct from joint
tenancy is a well established institution in the English common law
courts in the seventeenth century, though it is not yet given a name,
and it is said by the courts that the rules governing it are borrowed
from the Law Merchant.
A few years after this last decision, a case came before Lord
HoLT, in the King's Bench,3 in which A and B were co-partners,
and a judgment was against A, and all the goods both of A and B
were taken in execution. It was held, "that the sheriff must seize
3"Year Book, 38 Xdw. I1 (1365), fol. 7, tit. Accompt. For the difficulties in the
interpretation of this, compare Buckley v. Barber, 6 Exch. Rep. x66 and 177 (181).
=Hammon? v. Jethro, 2 B. & G. 99 (s6xr). The maxim, jus accrescendi, etc.,
appears to have been good law as early as the time of the publication. of the Laws of
Oleron. See Burdick, What is a Law Merchant? 2 Col. L. Rev., 484.
N Anonymous, i Mod. 45 (167o).
'
T Jefferey v. Small, x Vern. Chanc. 217 (z683).
= Heydon v. Heydon, x Salk. 392 (1693).
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all, because the moieties are undivided * * * and sell a moiety
thereof undivided, and the vendee will be tenant in common with
the other partner." This is usually interpreted as meaning that
"partners are co-owners of partnership property holding as joint
tenants." a  The fallacy involved in this decision was immediately
recognized. Only six years later40 the old doctrine that in partner-
ship the remedy alone survives was reiterated in the King's Bench,
but the confusion caused 'by the decision in Heydon v. Heydon. has
persisted down to the present time.4" This again is the old familiar
fallacy of premature definition and reasoning from a divided middle.
Lord HoLT is said by BuRDcic in the article before cited
-4 2 to be
"hostile to the innovations of Lombard Street." He refused to
accept the definition of partnership that had been worked out in the
Law Merchant, namely, that it is a joint holding of men who are
also acting conjointly. He looked only at the tenure side and there
was no tenure in English common law which fitted the situation ex-
cept joint tenacy. He therefore implicitly defined partners as joint
tenants. The rest follows inevitably. If A and B are joint tenants
and the sheriff severs the jointure by seizing A's share and selling
it to C, then C and B become tenants in common.- The trouble about
this is that none of it is true. The major premise is faulty. Part-
ners are not joint tenants. They are joint tenants plus, and any
attempt to eliminate the plus is like saying that two equals three.
Nothing seems to be added to the doctrine of partnership entity
-nor to that of tenancy in partnership by the- litigation of the eight-
eenth century. At the end of this century the law was practically
where it had been left by the case of M14 artin. v. Crump above cited, 3
though the confusion caused by the anomalous decision of Heydon
v- Heydon became steadily worse. It was due to the efforts of Lord
MANSVIELD, Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1756 to 1788,
that the Law Merchant was "received" into- the English Common
Law. During his long period of service he systematized the exist-
ing customs of merchants and embodied them in the decisions of
his court. Unfortunately for our purpose, not many partnership
cases came before him, and consequently we do not get his assist-
ance in answering these difficult questions as to the essential nature
of partnership.
22Cf. 29 Harv. L. Rev. 163, where Dean Lewis discusses the unsatisfactory char-
acter of the decision.
4 "Martin v. Crump, 2 Salk. 444 (1699).
41 Cf. note to Dean Lewis's discussion, . c., note 39, supra.
41 See Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. III, P. 45.
43 Cf. Note 40, supra.
PARTNERSHIP ENTITY
For a half-century after Lord MANSFIELD the courts seem to have
paid more attention to the legal fiction of a partnership by operation
of law independent of any agreement by the parties themselves than
to questions regarding the nature of partnership. It may be observed
in passing that the futile attempts to find a final test for the exist-
ence of this mythical institution, first s uggesed in the case of Grace
v. Smith, in 1775, shows again the characteristic features of a me-
chanical jurisprudence in the striving for an authoritative definition
to be used as a basis for deductive reasoning from a rule of law,
rather than a resort to the more rational process of determination
of a right from the position and reasonable expectations of the
parties.
44
THE MODERN ENTITY THEORY Ol PARTNERSHIP."
4
In his article on JUDICIAL MYTHS, before cited
4 6 
"Professor
"BURwcxC says that the American courts begin as early as 1832 to
talk about a partnership as a "person '4T" or "as an artificial personIor being, distinct from the individuals composing it."" This doc-
trine does not seem to have got into the treatises on partnership of
this period. STORY, in ihe first edition of his COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, published in 1841, does not mention it in his
discussion of English partnerships, although he: says that according
to the law of Scotland "the firm -constitutes a distinct person.
4
9
The first edition of PARSON'S, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNER-
SHIP, published in 1867, defines a "partnership as the combination
by two or more persons of capital, etc." He does not speak of a
"The whole course of litigation from Grace v. Smith, 2 Win. Bl. 998 (1775), through
Waugh v. Carver, 2 Hen. Bl. 235 (793), and Cox v. Hickman, 2 H. of L. 268 (86o),
to Mollwo v. Ct. of Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. Ap. 49 (S87a), and Beecher v. .Bush, 45
Mich. z88 (s88z), shows, in the words of the court in the last mentioned case, "that
in so far as the notion ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question of partner-
ship or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests it was erroneous and mis-
chievous." 45 Mich. 188.
45 An independent collection of the cases has not been made from this point on.
The cases cited in the various controversial articles appearing in late years have been
used. Among the articles thus used are The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 Cent. Law
Jour. 343, by William Hamilton Cowles (i9o3); the several articles discussing The Uni-
form Partnership Act by Dean William Draper Lewis and Judson A. Crane in 24 Yale
L. Jour. 617; 28 Harv. L. Rev. '762, and 29 Harv. Law Rev., 192 and 291
(rg5 and 1916); and the articles by Professor Burdick on Partnership Realty, 9 Col.
L. Rev. 197 (i9o9), and'Some Judicial Myths, 22 Hare. L. Rev. 392 (s9o9); also the
chapter on the Nature of Partnership, in Burdick, On Partnership.
"o Cf. Note 29, supra. It should be said that Professor Burdick does not include
the partnership entity in the category of judicial myths.
41 Warner v. Griswold. 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 665 (1832).
4Curtis v. Hollingshead, 2 Green. (14 N. J. L.) 402, 410 (1832).
42Story, On Partnership, ist ed., p. ii. It is noticeable that the form of this
statement shows the complete assimilation of the firm name; i. e. the name of the
group, with the juristic person. Cf. Note 24, supra.
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partnership as a person or as an entity, although he makes a sharp
distinction between the partnership and the joint tenancy or tenancy
in common, and says that the partnership is "neither of these com-
mon law tenures modified in certain ways."50  During the next
decade the courts begin to refer to a partnership as a "distinct en-
tity," 51 "a distinct and palpable entity, '5 2 a legal entity distinct and
different from the persons who constitute its component parts."5
Finally the term is incorporated in the definiton in- our standard text
on partnership cited at the beginning of this paper. Professor
BEALI says that the acceptance of the doctrine by American jurists
has been brought about mainly by the commanding influence of
Dean AMEs.
In 1905, Dean AmEs, as chairman of the committee appointed by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to codify the law of
partnership, secured the consent of that body "to draw it on the
lines of the mercantile theory of a partnership." 54  In accordance
with these instructions Dean AMEs submitted to the committee a
draft of a partnership.act in which a partnership 'is defined as "'a
legal person formed by association." This is usually quoted as
"Draft A" in the subsequent revisions of the act.55 When the com-
mittee, after Dean Ams's death in 191o, found that the difficulties
in the way of codification on the legal person theory seemed insur-
mountable, they went back to the association theory and prepared a
draft which after several revisions was finally given out as TH
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT,38 from which is taken the second defi-
nition quoted at the beginning of this paper.-" This Act had ,been
adopted in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Wisconsin by the year 1916,
and is before the legislatures of a number of the states, including
Michigan, during the present session.5
5 Parsons, Treatise on the Law of Partnership ist ed. (1867), p. 6 and p. 3.
1 Robertson v. Corsett. 39 Mich. 784 (1878).
0 Walker v. Wait, So Vt. 676 (1878).
531Henry v. Anderson. 77 Ind. 363 (1881).
54 Report of Amer. Bar Assoc. (19os), 757.
5 29 Harv. L. Rev. 57z, note xg. Cf. also p. z65, note 9.
wA full account of the labors of the committee, of which Dean William Draper
Lewis was chairman, and Mr. James B. Lichtenberger, of the Philadelphia Bar, asso-
ciate draftsman, is given in an article written by Dean Lewis in 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158,
and following.
"After Dean Ames's death the committee, of which Dean Lewis was the chair-
man, asked the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to be allowed
to continue the work on revision without being bound by the resolution passed at the
suggestion of Dean Ames in x9oS, which was assumed to confine them to the entity
theory. Report of Amer. Bar Assoc. (r9xo), 1044. The result of the labors of the
committee acting under these new instructions is found in the Uniform Partnership
Act of z914.
"a The Act was adopted by the Michigan House on February 6, 1g1, and by the
Senate on April 6, 1917.
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We may now consider the various points At which the need has
been felt for the entity doctrine to explain legal situations that called
for some unifying principle. As a matter of fact we do deal with
the "firm" as a something that is not the individual members them-
"selves. The firm is debited and credited on the partnership books.
"Admissions made by one partner in such circumstances as to be
binding upon the firm are receivable in actions against the partner-
ship; in such cases they are the admissions of the firm. and not of
the individual partner only."5 8 "A bill of sale conveying personal
property to a partnership by its firm name is valid * * * a mort-
gage of personal property to a partnership should be upheld under
like circumstances. '" Although in all these cases the firm is recog-
nized as something other than the individual members composing it,
no one of them assumes the existence of a unit entity extrinsic to
the individuals. We are in every case dealing with the composite
entity or group, not with a juristic person. The entity is immanent,
in the theological sense, not extrinsic to the indivduals as in the
artificial person. It has been held in the English Court of Appeal 0
that the infancy of a partner will not prevent an adjudication of
bankruptcy against the firm though the infant cannot be made sub-
ject to the bankrupt laws in respect of any debt contracted by the
firm of which he is a partner. It was ruled that the bankruptcy
proceedings should have been against the firm other than the infant
partner and that in the bankruptcy, proceedings the partnership
assets were available for the firm creditors. BuRDICK thinks this
is a "virtual recognition of the firm as an entity distinct from its
members." POLLOCK is quite positive that by it there is "no recog-
nition of the firm as an artificial person distinct from its mem-
bers.""' PoLLocK is here talking of the unit entity of the juristic
person while BuRiicic may be assumed to have in mind the compo-
site entity of the partnership grouping.
In an acute and learned article on THE FIRM AS A LEGAL PER-
SON,6 2 with very full citations of the cases on the subject, the
author, Mr. WILLAM HAMITON CowLEs, applies the "doctrine of
the personality of the firm as a test to a large and instructive class
of cases dealing with the distribution of firm assets in liquidation."
The typical case is that of partners A, B and C incurring a firm
debt. The partnership lien, by virtue of which either partner may
demand that the debt be paid out of firm assets, immediately at-
' Burdick, On Partnership, 2nd ed., p. 92.
"Hendren v. Wing, 6o Ark. 563 (x895).
14 Loveland and Christmas v. Beauchanp, xg App. Cases, 6o7 (894).
In Burdick, On Partnership, 2nd ed., p. 96 and Note x.
a CL 57. Cent. Law Journ. 343-3S3 (1go3).
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taches. The firm creditors' quasi-lien also becomes immediately ef-
fective, by which, in case of insolvency of the firm, they will have a
preference on firm assets as against claims of individual creditors.
If however all members of the firm have disposed of their interests
before the estate comes under the control of the court, the question
arises whether the quasi-lien still attaches to the firm assets. The
courts are divided on this point.63  Mr. Cowas follows the minority
opinion, apparently on the theory that neither partner owns the
firm assets as such but only his share in the residue after all claims
on those assets are met, and therefore a partner can not defeat the
quasi-lien by transferring such assets to a third party. He then
concludes: "If no one partner has any interest in the firm assets
themselves it necessarily follows that all of them have none. But
this is just what systems based on the Roman law mean by saying
that ownership is in the firm, an artificial person. '0 4  This conclu-
sion does not necessarily follow. The equitable rule of distribution
of the assets of an insolvent partnership applies not to the assets of
an artificial person extraneous to the individual partners but to the
assets of the group which have been set aside for the benefit of the
group and its creditors by the contract of partnership itself. It
would seem that the variation in the decisions of the courts on this
point hinge on a much simpler question; namely, may a partner or
all the partners by any manipulation of the partnership assets de-
prive a creditor of the benefit of the quasi-lien upon which he de-
pended when he dealt with the firm? The apparent injustice of this
has appealed to the New York court and those courts that side with
it. On the other hand the courts that are in the majority might well
ask, if the quasi-lien is not terminated when a partner retires from
the partnership, when will it be terminated? It would apparently
result that if any chattel were once involved in a partnership busi-
ness, it would be subject to this hidden incumbrance at least until
the end of the statutory period.G5
6 Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146 (1873), is a typical case which holds that the
quasi-lien is still good. Stahl v. Osmer, 31 Ore. 199 (1897), holds to the contrary, and
this court claims that it represents the great weight of authority.
' Op cit., p. 348.
'- Mr. Cowles's account of the confusion of a partner's interest with a tenancy in
common or a joint tenancy seems not borne out by the sequence of cases. Lord Holt
announced in x693 [See Heydon v. Heydon, i Salk. 392] that the vendee of a partner's
interest was "tenant in common with the other partner." The equitable rule of dis-
tribution was not established by Ex parte Crowder (1715). It existed at least in a
qualified form as early as 1683 [See Lord Craven v. Knight, 2 Chan. R. 226], and at
that time the tenancy in common and the tenancy in partnership had not been amalga-
mated. Cf. supra.
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Many instances are cited by Mr. JUDSON A. CaRNz8 0 in which the
courts have treated the firm as a person. "A bill bearing the name
of two firms engaged in two distinct trades, is signed by two per-
sons." 7 To be sure, but they are not artificial persons extrinsic to
the individuals. Each firm name is the collective name of Titius et
socii, just as it was in the time of BARToLus, but this collective name
has not merged with the juristic person in the nineteenth century
as it did in the sixteenth.08 "Joint creditors of all the partners on
obligations not arising out of partnership transactions cannot prove
against the firm estate."8 9 Because the joint debtors in the one case
hold their estate in joint tenancy, while in the other they hold as
tenants in partnership, whom the creditors of the firm have trusted.
In England there is no distinction between firm debts and partners'
joint debts, 0 because the same group is trusted in either case. Again,
"Two firms consisting in part of the same members are joined in an
insolvency proceeding. A non-resident creditor who has proved
against one is not barred thereby from later seeking to enforce a
claim against the other." 71 Here again there is no need for thinking
of the two firms as juristic persons. They are simply different
groupings of the same persons.
The cases in which the courts have treated a single firm doing
business in two separate jurisdictions as two entities can 'be ex-
plained in a similar way. "Taylor and Cassily were a firm doing
business in Cincinnati and New Orleans, Taylor managing the New
Orleans house, Cassily the one in Cincinnati. A draft drawn in
Cincinnati, by a creditor of the firm, on Taylor and Cassily, New
Orleans, and accepted in Cincinnati by Cassily, was held to be
drawn on a 'mercantile person' outside the jurisdiction of Ohio."72
The "mercantile person" was the collective name of .the group doing
business in Louisiana.
Whether or not the Bankruptcy Act of July i, 1898, determined
that the partnership was an entity in the Bankruptcy Court has
been a subject of spirited discussion almost from the date it was
promulgated. Professor BuRnicx says, in i9o9, that the general
opinion of those engaged in teaching the subject of partnership at
that time was that the Act did "give full effect to the partnership
SThe Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28 iHrv. L. Rev. 767 and 768.
07Second National Bank v. Burt, 93 N. Y. 233 (1883).
C f. Note 25, supra.
23 Harv. L. Rev.. 767.
71 Hoare v. Oriental Bank Corp., 2 Ap. Cas. 589, 597 (1877).
71 Pattea v. Paige, 163 Mass. 352 (1895).
" West v. Valley Bank, 6 Oh. St. 168 (856). Ci. Burdick, On Partnership,
2nd ed., 83.
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entity doctrine. 7T3 In a note in the MICHIGAN LAW REvIEw,7 4 in
1912, Mr. GEORGE E. HUMPHREYS reviews the litigation on this
subject down to the date mentioned. He assumes that the Bank-
ruptcy Act does recognize that a partnership is an entity and con-
cludes that "a partnership will be uniformly declhred to be an entity
as an entity, for all purposes in bankruptcy." This note was written
before the final decision was rendered in Francis v. McNeal. In the
final decision of this case, 75 Mr. Justice HOLMEs said that although
the clauses of Sections I, 5a, and I4a "taken together recognize the
firm as an entity for certain purposes, the most important of which,
after all, is the old rule as to the prior claim of partnership debts on
partnership assets and that of indi'vidual debts upon the individual
estate." nevertheless, "The firm remains at common law a group of
men and will be dealt with as such in the ordinary courts. * * *"
Here again it would seem that the entity, if it exists within the
meaning of the statute, is the composite entity of the group and not
the unit entity of an extrinsic juristic person.
QUID EST QUOD HAEC FABULA DOCET?
At the end of the Pandects,76 when the codifiers are wearied, and
we may assume somewhat discouraged, with their task, they say,
"Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est: parum est enim ut
non subverti posset." It is usually acknowledged to be one of the
great merits of the Corpus Juris Civilis that it has so far as possible
avoided final rigid definition. In many places the Digest reads like
a succession of syllabi of cases. Typical statements of facts, either
actual or hypothetical, are laiddown, followed by the decisions on
those facts. In place of an abstract definition in the form of a rule
of law we have the presentation of the facts in a typical case, and a
statement of the rights of the parties in view of all the circum-
stances. With reference to this point the description of a partner-
ship in THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT has the advantage of the
more abstract definition of a partnership as an entity. A, B and C
do hold property together. They do unite in dealing with it and
with other persons and groups. The statement then that "a part-
nership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit"7 7 simply states the fact that A, B and
C have united their property, labor and skill for a joint effort. The
22 Harv. I.. Rev., 397.
14 io Mich. L. Rev.. 215.
7 Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (3973).
76 Digest, 50. 17. 202.
1 U. P. A., See. 6, (0).
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statement that they are "tenants in partnership 78 again simply de-
scribes a typical situation. The parties are holding together and are
acting as partners. The character of such action is then described
in the next section under the incidents of such tenancy.7 9
The connotation of the idea of a firm is not the same as that of
a juristic person. The firm concept, under which A, B and C hold
jointly and act each for the group, differs in its very essence from
the unit entity in which A, B and C are acting as agents for the
persona, X, extrinsic to the natural persons. The mediaeval law
on the Continent brought the firm concept and the unit entity to-
gether by identifying the collective name with the artificial person,
and in all the modem derivatives of the mediaeval Roman law of
the Continent this amalgamation has persisted. The English Com-
mon Law in the seventeenth century had the idea of tenure highly
developed and had also an elaborate scheme of group tenures in the
forms of joint tenancy, coparcenary, and tenancy in common. But
these were land tenures and were tenures simply, passive rights to
hold, without active functions. During the earlier part of the sev-
enteenth century, as we have seen above, when English courts dealt
with active functions of the group in partnership, they borrowed
from the mercantile law of the moribund staple and merchants'
courts. But Lord HoLT, in Heydon v. Heydon, (1693), in an at-
tempt to identify partnership with tenure, defined partners as joint
tenants and the vendee of one partner's share as a tenant in common
with the other partner, i. e., he attempted to amalgamate the tenure
concept and the firm concept, above mentioned. Although the error
was almost immediately recognized, it took more than a century of
litigation to unscramble these two ideas. Indeed the law at the pres-
ent time still shows some of the -bad results of this forced union.
But one of the effects of this struggle continued down through the
eighteenth century was to get firmly fixed in the minds of common
law courts and lawyers the idea that a partnership holding was sui
generis, although a specific name for it does not seem to have been
found until much later, and such a name seems to be necessary to
keep an idea from coalescing with one similar to it.80
In the nineteenth century, courts and jurists had to deal with the
same problem as regards the firm concept and the unit entity which
had confronted Lord HoiT in regard to the tenure concept and the
firm concept. Modem English and American legalists had also a
mediaeval precedent which had come down in Modern Roman Law
I . P. A., See. 25. ( o).U. P. A., Sec. 25. (2), (2)-(e).
Cf. 9 Col. L. ReV. 213, Note 83.
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for identifying the group function of partnership with the juristic
person. The amalgamation of the two was made the easier by the
use of the word "entity" to describe the new concept, and by not
recognizing that the unit entity of the juristic person and the com-
posite entity of the partnership group, though similar in name, were
quite distinct in their essence.
The confusion into which the courts fell by the partial adoption
but hesitating acceptance of the entity doctrine may be shown by
decisions in the New York court, which was the first to adopt it,
according to Professor BURIICK.8 1 In the case of Warner v. Gris-
wold,""y, the court said, "They [partners] constitute but one person
in the law." This court also said, in llenagh v. Whitwell, in 1873:
"The well established rule which excludes creditors of the several
partners from the partnership property until that has paid the debts
of the partnership is derived from the acknowledgement that a part-
nership is a body by itself." But a few years laters'-' the same court
said: "The firm is not recognized by lawyers as distinct from the
members composing it." Mr. COwLES in the article above cited, says
the New York court "has said quite recently that it was only joking
in its repeated declarations that the firm is a person."8' 3 Examples
of similar wavering may be found in many other courts. The trouble
seems to be that when the courts have needed a unifying principle
they have assumed the unit entity of a juristic person to satisfy this
need and then have found this definition is not in accord with actual
facts in litigation. They have failed to recognize that an entity is,
as Dean LEwis says,M "phenomena grouped in the mind as possess-
ing a common attribute not had by other phenomena"--and that the
composite entity of the group satisfies this definition as well as does
the unit entity of the juristic person.
Finally, as regards the precedents: The classical Roman law of
partnership had common tenure well developed, in comntunio, also
the group function, a composite entity which included the passive
holding by the group combined with a group activity, in the societas.
There is, however, no hint of unit entity of the juristic person in
the classic law of partnership. The mediaeval Law MNlerchant on
the Continent by the fourteenth century had developed a composite
entity and described it with the collective name, Titius et socii. By
the sixteenth century the mediaeval lawyer had succeeded in amalga-
mating this composite entity with the unit entity of the juristic per-
22 Harv. L. Rev. 393.
1" 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 666 (1832).
"The Bank of Buffalo v. Thompson, 121 N. Y. 280 (189o).
83The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 Cent. Law Journ. 352 (1903).
84 29 Harv. L,. Rev. 161.
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son and was treating this partnership entity as identical with a cor-
porate body. In the English Year Books the common tenure side of
partnership was developing on the lines of common tenure of land.
On the active side the partnership law borrowed from the law of
merchants and established, apparently unconsciously, a "tenancy in
partnership," though it did not give it a name. The courts kept
these two concepts well separated, attributing the characteristics of
land tenure to the passive, holding right in partnership, and indicat-
ing that the joint function, including the passive and active right in
partnership, is a creature of the Law Merchant. During most of
the seventeenth centufy the courts maintain a sharp distinction be-
tween joint tenure and partnership right, and the reaction after Lord
HOLT'S unsuccessful attempt at bringing the two together under one
definition, has made a sharply defined line of cleavage between these
two concepts in our modern partnership law.
We thus begin the nineteenth century with no precedent for the
entity theory derived from classic Roman law and with the precedent
in mediaeval law resting on a false analogy. The attempt within
the last half century to make the composite entity identical with the
unit entity seems to have failed because in the language of one of
our supreme courts: "A partnership cannot be considered as a
person in contra-distinction to the persons composing it, simply be-
cause such is not its nature."8' 5
It is argued that this conclusion is reactionary because so many
of our most advanced legal scholars during the last three decades
have espoused the entity theory. Perhaps one answer to this might
be that the Archon of the Progressive Party, Dean LEwis, of the
University of Pennsylvania, is the draftsman of the present Act.
Furthermore he tells us88 that all but one of the legal scholars, who
agreed finally to the codification on the associative theory, had at
one time believed that our law should adopt the legal person theory
of partnership. All of those who were of this opinion changed their
-minds because of the arguments advanced at their final conference
held at Philadelphia in 1911. If the theory put forward in this
s1 Stayton, C. J., in Wiggins v. Blackshear, 86 Tex. 670, (1894).
86 29 Harv. L. Rev. 172. At the meeting of the Committee on Commercial Law of
the Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, held at Philadelphia on
Feb. 3-4, x9i, the aggregate theory was supported by Professor Francis Burdick, Pro-
fessor Floyd R. Mechem, Professor George D. Zohm, Professor William R. Vance, Pro-
fessor Aymar, and Mr. George Wharton Pepper and judge Francis C. Lowell. Professor
Samuel WVilliston is said to have advocated the entity theory at that meeting (see 23
Green Bag 220), but in an address before the Law Association of Philadelphia on
December 18. 2914. Professor Williston seems inclined to favor the adoption of The
Uniform Partnership Act which is based on the aggregate theory. See 63 Univ. of
Penn. Law Rev. 209.
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paper is correct, it is the entity doctrine that is the more reactionary,
because on the precedent of a false analogy, it attempts to substi-
tute a mechanical rule of law for a live working formula, by which
our courts may decide cases in accordance with the circumstances
and the reasonable expectations of the parties litigant.
Our legislatures should adopt the tenancy in partnership and
reject the partnership entity.
Josim H. DRAKZ.
University of Michigan Law School.
